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Abstract 
The history of comitology – the system of implementation committees that control the 
Commission in the execution of delegated powers – has been characterised by institutional 
tensions. The crux of these tensions has often been the role of the European Parliament and 
its quest to be granted powers equal to those of the Council. Over time this tension has been 
resolved through a series of inter-institutional agreements and Comitology Decisions, 
essentially giving the Parliament incremental increases in power. This process came to a head 
with the 2006 Comitology reform and the introduction of the regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny (RPS). After just over three years of experience with the RPS procedure, and having 
revised the entire acquis communautaire, the Treaty of Lisbon made has made it redundant 
through the creation of Delegated Acts (Article 290 TFEU), which gives the Parliament equal 
rights of oversight. This article aims to evaluate the practical implications that Delegated Acts 
will entail for the Parliament, principally by using the four years of experience with the RPS 
to better understand the challenges ahead. This analysis will be of interest to those following 
the study of comitology, formal and informal interinstitutional relations, and also to 
practitioners who will have to work with Delegated Acts in the future. 
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I Introduction  
From obscure beginnings in the field of purely technical agricultural markets in the 1960s the 
comitology system has gained an ever- increasing importance in European Union decision-
making.
1
 While 454 legislative acts were adopted during the sixth legislature under Barroso I 
(2004-2009), 14,522 non-legislative acts, i.e. implementing measures, were agreed upon. 
Understanding how the 266 comitology committees that were responsible for these measures 
work is crucial for a complete picture of EU policy-making.
2
 The importance of 
understanding how these measures are adopted has gained further necessity with the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the changes it is ushering in.  
Whilst comitology has been about since the 1960s the European Parliament, however, has 
only recently gained a foothold in the comitology system. In explicit response to a number of 
the Parliament’s claims concerning its involvement in the delegation of powers to the 
Commission
3
 it was subsequently given the following three powers: firstly, the right of 
information (Article 7 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC); secondly the right of scrutiny 
(Article 8 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC, known better by its French name of droit de 
regard), which is the right for the Parliament to pass a non-binding resolution if it considers 
that the Commission has gone beyond its implementing powers. By adding a fifth comitology 
procedure in 2006, next to the advisory, management, regulatory and safeguard procedures, 
the regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS) granted the Parliament a third power; the right 
of veto over individual measures. The creation of this procedure was symbolically very 
important because it granted the Parliament powers over comitology that more accurately 
reflected its powers in co-decision. It effectively increased democratic control over 
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comitology decisions
4
 and brought the Parliament onto an almost-equal footing with the 
Council for all basic acts adopted under codecision.   
The Treaty of Lisbon significantly changes the practice of comitology in a number of ways, 
two of which are worth expanding on. First, it extends the co-decision procedure (ordinary 
legislative procedure) to 45 additional policy areas, meaning that the scope of Parliament 
involvement in comitology is extended. This role is important as over time implementing 
measures have evolved from simple technical agricultural measures, as they were in the 
1960s, to substantial political, economic and financial measures across all policy areas. 
Secondly, Article 290 TFEU takes the RPS category of implementing measures and gives it a 
separate legal base and a totally new procedure from standard Implementing Acts (Article 
291 TFEU): Delegated Acts. Next to a strengthened right of veto, Delegated Acts provide the 
Parliament with a fourth power in comitology: the right of revocation of the delegation to the 
Commission. Under this new situation the Parliament will thus have four main powers in 
comitology, and moreover, stand on an equal footing with the Council. The implications of 
this recent change are considerable and therefore require serious attention by the Parliament 
itself, the Council, the Commission and outside stakeholders.  
This article takes up the call and offers a timely analysis of RPS and what this could mean for 
Delegated Acts. Based on the experiences from the last three and a half years in Parliament it 
is possible to draw a series of helpful lessons for these new Delegated Acts. As we will show 
RPS was used several times, but often in somewhat different ways to those originally 
foreseen. The Parliament, in particular, has gained experience with RPS that it will carry over 
into its work with Delegated Acts – principally in two ways: Firstly, through the negotiation 
of RPS into legislative acts in codecision through both the alignment of the acquis 
communautaire in 2008, and through open co-decision dossiers. Secondly, through the 
monitoring of, and objecting to, draft RPS measures that were forwarded to the Parliament.  
The article is structured as follows: to start with it compares the ‘old’ RPS procedure with the 
‘new’ Delegated Acts procedure to identify key similarities and differences, which will help 
to understand the lessons to be drawn for the future practise of comitology. Then, six 
questions with clear relevance for delegated acts frame the remainder of the article. First, we 
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look into how the Council and the Parliament decided to introduce RPS into existing 
legislation. Assessing how far the criteria for ‘quasi-legislative measures’ were clear enough 
for ‘technical’ application, or whether room for interpretation and therefore negotiation 
existed, has direct implications for the insertion of Delegated Acts into legislation in the 
future. The second and third questions relate to the effects of RPS on the administrative 
organisation and political procedures of the Parliament, which relate directly to its future 
ability and willingness to deal with Delegated Acts, a practise that should not be too 
dissimilar in internal organisation and political terms to how it had to deal with RPS 
measures. The fourth question addresses the usage of the RPS, which shows that the 
Parliament was not tempted to use its RPS powers too often, thus not frustrating the smooth 
implementation of legislation. The uses of the RPS highlight a number of interesting practises 
with direct relevance for the future of Delegated Acts, such as the notion that the Parliament 
should have the power to explicitly approve draft measures under RPS, despite the fact that 
this was not foreseen in the 2006 revised Comitology Decision. Whilst only a few examples 
of so-called ‘early approvals’ were recorded, this practise proves interesting for the future. 
Another aspect of RPS usage concerns the fear that was raised, that the Parliament would 
lack the necessary expertise to deal with technical draft measures under RPS, and thus rely 
too heavily on lobbyists. The last years have clearly shown that these fears might have been 
arbitrary and the implications of Delegated Acts are important. Finally, we identify cases 
where the threat of a veto (‘atomic bomb’) led to a ‘de facto right of parliamentary 
amendment’ – an interesting development for the future adoption of Delegated Acts where 
the atomic bomb power of the Parliament is significantly increased. We conclude with the 
theoretical implications of our findings. 
 
II Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (RPS) and Delegated Acts (Article 290 
TFEU) 
Before looking at the lessons that we can draw from RPS for Delegated Acts it is important to 
outline the actual theory of both RPS and Delegated Acts.  
A Regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS) 
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Despite attempts to create a simplified procedure and increase transparency and public 
understanding of comitology, in line with the broader European Better Regulation agenda, the 
result of the 2006 comitology reform with the new RPS was rather convoluted.  
Three conditions determined whether RPS should be used or not: firstly, the act was a co-
decision act; second, the measure was of general scope; and finally, only quasi-legislative 
non-essential elements of the basic act were concerned. Having noted that the criteria were 
legally binding if present, determining their presence needed to be done on a case by case 
basis via negotiations in co-decision. This was particularly the case in determining the 
category of quasi-legislative measures, which was a notorious grey zone, which we will come 
back to. Once the procedure was included in secondary legislation the next important stage 
was that of the comitology committee and the vote on an implementing measure (see also 
figure 1). Here the Commission submits its draft measure to the committee for a vote at 
which point there are two possible outcomes: 
1. In the case of a positive opinion5 of the comitology committee the Commission 
forwards the measure to both the Council and the Parliament who then have up to 
three months to oppose the measure. If there is no opposition from either legislator the 
Commission can adopt the measure after the three month period has lapsed. In the 
case of opposition Article 5a stipulates that: 
the European Parliament, acting by a majority of its component members, or the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, may oppose the adoption of the said draft by the Commission, 
justifying their opposition by indicating that the draft measures proposed by the Commission 
exceed the implementing powers provided for in the basic instrument or that the draft is not 
compatible with the aim or the content of the basic instrument or does not respect the 
principles of subsidiarity or proportionality.
6
 
        
If opposition, based on these three criteria, is found, then the Commission needs to 
either re-submit to the committee or present a legislative proposal. The co-legislators 
therefore have the same three criteria on which to base their opposition. It should be 
made clear that this does not grant them the right to oppose a draft measure because 
they are generally not satisfied with (a part of) its content, but they can only oppose 
                                                          
5
 A positive opinion of the committee requires a Qualified Majority Vote in favour, therefore at least 255 votes 
6
 Council Decision 2006/512/EC amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise 
of implementing powers conferred on the Commission 
 6 
the whole measure on the basis of these strict legal criteria. It is also important to note 
that no provisions are put into the Decision to either allow for the adoption of an 
implementing measure within the three month period, or to amend the content in case 
of opposition. Therefore if either legislator opposes a single line in the implementing 
measure they have to oppose the entire measure. If they agree they simply have to let 
the time period lapse and the Commission in practise has to wait three months before 
adopting the measure. 
2. In the case of a negative, or no opinion7 of the comitology committee the Parliament 
does not maintain its status of equality with the Council. The measure goes first to the 
Council who has three options; firstly to oppose the measure in which case the 
Commission could modify the proposal and re-submit to the Council; secondly to 
envisage adoption, in which case it forwards the measure to the Parliament or; thirdly 
it took no decision within the allotted time-frame, in which case the Commission 
forwards the measure to the Parliament. If the second or third option were taken then 
the Parliament enjoyed the same three legal criteria outlined above to make an 
objection. 
FIGURE 1  Regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS) 
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Source: Own creation from Council Decision 2006/512/EC 
Delegated Acts (Article 290 TFEU) 
Against the backdrop of the RPS procedure we now outline the new Article 290 TFEU on 
Delegated Acts to allow a direct comparison. Under Article 290 TFEU a legislative act may 
delegate to the Commission the power to adopt a non-legislative act to supplement or amend 
certain non-essential elements of the legislative act. The Treaty does not directly foresee a 
common approach to the application of this article, instead prescribing that the objectives, 
content, scope and duration of the delegation of power shall be explicitly defined in the 
legislative acts. In addition the legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to 
which the delegation is subject, and the Treaty mentions two such possible conditions; 
1. The Delegated Act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by 
the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
2. The European Parliament (by Absolute Majority) or the Council (by Qualified 
Majority) may decide to revoke the delegation. 
Whilst, from this rudimentary Treaty base a number of details need to be fleshed out, five 
important innovations can already be highlighted (see TABLE 1).  
TABLE 1 Comparison of Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (RPS) and Delegated Acts 
(Article 290 TFEU) 
Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (RPS) 
(2006- December 2009) 
Delegated Acts (Art. 290 TFEU) 
(as from December 2009 in force) 
A Common framework  
Article 5a of the Comitology Decision 2006 
No binding common framework 
Conditions to be decided case by case 
Necessity to obtain an opinion from a 
comitology committee 
Comitology committees not foreseen 
Likely use of expert groups which will 
not give a legally binding opinion 
Parliament and Council are not completely on 
an equal footing  
Perfect equal footing between EP and 
Council  
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Limited grounds for the right of veto 
1. Commission exceeds competences 
2. The measure is not compatible with the aim 
or content of the basic act 
3.  The measure does not respect the principles 
of subsidiarity or proportionality 
No limited grounds for the right of veto 
 A new right to revoke the delegation 
No limited grounds for the right of 
revocation 
 Source: Own data retrieved from Commission Communication from 9 December 2009 on Delegated Acts.  
First, the modalities and conditions for Delegated Acts will be defined on a case by case 
basis, as opposed to being subject to a horizontal application. Hence, Article 290 TFEU does 
not require the adoption of any binding instrument of secondary legislation to ensure its 
implementation. Second, there are no comitology committees foreseen under Article 290 
TFEU which is a sharp deviation from past practise. Third, there is an equal footing for the 
Parliament and the Council for veto and revocation, the second of which is a new power 
granted to the legislators as recognition of the sensitive nature of the delegation. Fourth, the 
right of veto over implementing measures occurs after adoption by the Commission and is 
discretionary, not subject to any legal criteria. This is also a major departure from the RPS 
and will create a significantly different procedure in practical terms.  
It is important to highlight a practical element of the introduction of Article 290 TFEU, 
notably that it had immediate effect because it did not need secondary legislation to bring it 
into force. Therefore RPS was no longer usable in new basic acts, which as of December 
2009 had to foresee the insertion of Delegated Acts. This said RPS, through insertion into 
open codecision dossiers between 2006 and 2009 and the revision of the entire acquis 
communautaire, continues to exist in a number of legal acts. This poses a rather practical 
problem of whether to again try an omnibus approach to switching from RPS to Delegated 
Acts, or to make the changes on a case by case basis as secondary legislation gets revised. 
Whichever approach is finally chosen RPS will soon be confined to the history books, the 
only issue being how quickly this happens. 
This short section has highlighted that there are definite similarities between the RPS and 
Delegated Acts, notably in terms of application – but also that RPS and Delegated Acts have 
some very important differences. The next section, through a series of pertinent questions, 
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will address the implications of the change from RPS to Delegated Acts whilst 
simultaneously looking at what can be learnt from our experience of RPS for the future 
practise of Delegated Acts. 
 
III RPS in Practise in the European Parliament 
A How did Council and Parliament decide on the introduction of RPS in legislation? 
Article 2 paragraph 2 of the Comitology Decision 2006/512/EC clearly defines three criteria 
for the applicability of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS). Firstly, the act is a co-
decision act, secondly the measures is of general scope, and finally, only quasi-legislative 
non-essential elements are concerned. Although one could imagine that applying the criteria 
would be a purely legalistic and technical matter, the codecision procedure still involved 
some genuine, and difficult, political negotiations between the institutions. Even if the 
arguments are legal, the three criteria for the application of the RPS are such that the legal 
services from the three institutions have had different interpretations, providing room for 
negotiation.   
The introduction of RPS into the acquis communautaire took place through the so-called 
omnibus packages. The Parliament was represented by Mr. Szajer, rapporteur for the Legal 
Affairs committee (JURI), and the Council by the Slovenian and French presidencies. Four 
omnibus packages were agreed and introduced at the end of 2007 – and a fifth became 
obsolete with the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon
8
 (see also TABLE 2). As a 
consequence, most of the general alignment exercise took place in 2008 with a negotiation 
time ranging between 3.5 and 14 months. In addition, all four packages were concluded in 
first reading agreements.   
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TABLE 2  General alignment of RPS through omnibus-packages 
Omnibus proposal Number of basic acts Date of proposal Date of adoption 
1
st
 package 59 23.11.2007 11.3.2008 
2
nd
 package 47 19.12.2007 22.10.2008 
3
rd
 package 4 19.12.2007 11.3.2009 
4
th
 package 46 February 2008 22.10.2008 
5
th
 package 2 30.3.2009 Obsolete 
Source: Commission Reports on Committees (2008, 2009, 2010)
9
. 
The way in which the omnibus packages were adopted was very similar to the overall 
patterns observed in the total number of 454 codecision files adopted under Barroso I (2004-
2009). During the sixth legislature the average length of time for first reading agreements was 
16.2 months
10
. In addition, the general trend of first reading agreements has continued and 
even been reinforced, as 72% of files
11
 were concluded at first reading.
12
  All in all, the 
negotiations of the four omnibus-packages followed the general trends observed in the 454 
codecision files adopted between 2004 and 2009.  
In addition, this exercise gave all three institutions significant experience in applying the 
criteria for the use of RPS – which facilitated some precedent on when to apply RPS in 
certain circumstances. Experience shows that the Council, the Parliament and the 
Commission always came to an agreement on the insertion of RPS, even if became the 
subject of difficult discussions. There was no case where recourse to the Court of Justice was 
deemed necessary, despite the fact the use of RPS was obligatory when the three criteria were 
met. In this sense RPS simply became another element of negotiation in co-decision
13
, but an 
                                                          
9
 European Commission (2010) Report from the Commission on the working of Committees during 2009, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union.; European Commission (2009) Report 
from the Commission on the working of Committees during 2008, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities; European Commission (2008) Report from the Commission on the working of 
Committees during 2007, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
10
 European Parliament (2009) Activity Report 1 May 2004 to 13 July 2009 of the delegations to the 
Conciliation Committee, Luxembourg, pp 13 
11
 Ibid, pp 8 
12
 For further details on 1
st
 reading and ‘early’ 2nd reading agreements see H. Farrell and A. Héritier, ‘Formal 
and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-Building in Europe’, (2003) Governance 
16(4), pp 577-600; M. Kaeding and S. Hurka, ‘Where are the MEPs from the accession countries?  
Rapporteurship assignments in the European Parliament after Enlargement’, (2010) Eipascope 2 pp 19-24 
 
13
 A. Héritier and C. Moury, ‘Contested Delegation : The Impact of Codecision on Comitology’, (2009) EUI 
Working Paper RSCAS (64) 
 11 
important one especially for those areas of legislation that involve extensive delegation to the 
Commission, such as environment, transport and economic and monetary affairs.  
This is good news for the upcoming codecision files that will need to foresee Delegated Acts. 
The first Delegated Act inserted into a legislative text since the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon was adopted on 9 March 2010 and dealt with animal health requirements applicable 
to the non-commercial movement of pet animals
14
. Despite a joint declaration that the 
wording found would not constitute a precedent the compromise text was only found after 
intensive discussions. Due to prior experience with RPS measures, however, it took the 
Parliament, Council and Commission only nine months to agree the file in first reading.  
The main change that is likely to occur in the future when negotiating the insertion of 
Delegated Acts into legislative texts is that the conditions can be negotiated on a case by case 
basis – meaning that the duration and conditions to which the delegation is subject is likely to 
be different in different fields. The negotiation of Delegated Acts into legislative files will 
likely follow the patterns discerned with RPS, although given that Delegated Acts present the 
Parliament with considerably more power there are likely to be a few changes. In the past the 
negotiation of RPS into the text was a one-off negotiation because the procedure was already 
defined in the Comitology Decision – but the negotiation of Delegated Acts, once it has been 
agreed that they will be used, will have to find agreement on all the different elements 
therein. Whilst a standard model, along the lines of a common understanding, can reasonably 
be expected to prevail there will also likely be creative additions that could gain currency 
over time. A final aspect of the codecision negotiations is important to address, even if a 
definitive answer is impossible to find, and that is the existence of a grey zone with regard to 
the difference between Delegated Acts and Implementing Acts. It is clear that a Delegated 
Act is used when the tasks delegated relate to legislative power and an Implementing Act 
deals with implementing powers that would normally fall to the Member States – but there is 
a grey zone between the two where room for negotiation exists. The ultimate arbitrator of this 
grey one would be the European Court of Justice, but they have yet to be called on to decided 
where the line is, and even if they were to be required to judge on this issue it is unlikely they 
would issue a strong definitive ruling that would by definition touch on legislative 
prerogatives. The dispute between the Commission and Council early in 2010 over the recast 
Industrial Emissions draft directive highlights that this grey zone will continue to pose inter-
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institutional tensions
15
. Until now codecision has managed to find agreement on the insertion 
of RPS and Delegated Acts, but this is a fragile situation that could be broken at any moment. 
 
B What were the effects of RPS on the administrative organisation of the European 
Parliament? 
When the RPS procedure entered into force in 2006 most actors involved understood 
immediately that applying the enhanced powers would effectively require two things: inter-
institutional changes and a more thorough internal parliamentary screening of comitology 
draft measures sent by the Commission.  
Inter-institutional changes: The first requirement was linked to the need to adapt the practical 
inter-institutional arrangements in place such that the sending of documents by the 
Commission, and the receipt of documents by the Parliament, was robust and trustworthy. 
Some instances had shown previously that the agreement had failed to be respected, leading 
to increased dissatisfaction of the Parliament.
16
 In fact the Parliament had often felt frustrated 
by its dependence on the goodwill of the Commission to transmit documents, a practice 
which had been unpredictable and lacking in legal obligation. Most of these arrangements 
were laid down in a revised interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament 
and the Commission
17
 which entered into force on 3 June 2008. This was further reinforced 
by a revised framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the 
Commission from 29 June 2010 adapting the existing arrangements to the new Lisbon Treaty 
provisions. This 2010 agreement addressed, amongst other things, the comitology register, 
time limits, the availability of language versions, the taking into account of the parliamentary 
recess and the increased involvement of the Parliament with Delegated Act expert groups. 
As for the register, the European Commission reformed its existing comitology register, 
which was put in place on 1 April 2008. More information about the history and outcome of 
comitology procedures has been added since. Aside from public access to the register, which 
contains only a limited number of documents, the Parliament was given preferential access to 
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the system in order to have access to draft measures before their formal adoption. Despite the 
fact that the new comitology register is a very helpful instrument for the Parliament, some 
problems are still encountered. They relate mostly to the correct and timely uploading of 
information by the Commission services. This is probably a learning curve issue within the 
Commission's services, who were until recently mainly focused on getting draft measures 
prepared in time for comitology committee meetings, but not on informing the Parliament 
afterwards of the decisions taken. Raising awareness inside the Commission by means of 
circulars from the Secretariat General or training programmes may help to solve these 
problems. An issue for Delegated Acts in this respect is the question of how the Commission 
will involve the Parliament in the drafting process, because the Commission will not want to 
send the Delegated Act to the Parliament to exercise its scrutiny without having involved 
them earlier, to understand their concerns. This might involve forms of early warning using 
the register, but this remains to be seen. 
A second inter-institutional issue arose very quickly in the practise of RPS the need, or 
possibility of having ‘early approvals’ – because these were not foreseen in either the 
Comitology Decision or the revised 2008 interinstitutional agreement. Nevertheless, nothing 
could have prevented the Parliament from approving a draft measure, a practise which the 
Council has already taken on a regular, if not systematic, basis. Where measures were not 
controversial and not initially contested by the Parliament, the normal procedure was simply 
to do nothing and let time go by until the deadline lapsed, at which point the Commission 
could adopt the draft measure. The Commission, however, expressed in a number of cases the 
desire that the Parliament approve measures without waiting the full three months. This 
occurred mainly in ECON, with the last cases in May 2010 on International Financial 
Reporting Standards and UCITS. They led to the Commissioner responsible drafting a letter 
to the Committee Chair to ask if the Parliament could find a mechanism to provide and early 
agreement. In these cases it was up to the parliamentary committee concerned to decide how 
to deal with such a request. In some cases committees indicated that at a given stage no 
objection had been made, which could be read as an informal approval, but that it could only 
be legally formal once the deadline had lapsed, given that members had the right to object 
until the deadline passed. So, it was up to the Commission services to decide whether they 
took the risk of adopting the draft measure before the deadline. This is a good example of the 
learning process from RPS to Delegated Acts because the report of the Parliament on 
 14 
Delegated Acts, adopted in March 2010, explicitly mentions the possibility of using early 
approval in Delegated Acts
18
.  
Changes to parliamentary internal procedures: Next to the inter-institutional changes, the 
Parliament also made a number of adaptations to its internal organisation. Draft measures 
from the Commission come in at a central level to the Directorate General for the Presidency 
and are subsequently distributed according to subject to the parliamentary committees 
concerned. The committee secretariats then distributed draft measures to their members in 
differing ways, indicating applicable deadlines.  
The twenty individual parliamentary standing committees have developed their own practices 
on how to inform their MEPs. It ranges from the simple direct forwarding of draft measures 
by email to grouping the draft measures in a regular comitology newsletter, with or without 
explanatory remarks and analysis. Although any member of a parliamentary committee has 
the right to ask for the tabling of a Resolution on a draft measure, many committees give, also 
for practical reasons, the role to the ‘coordinators’ of the political groups in the committee. 
The role attributed to coordinators is to perform a preliminary assessment of the need to table 
a Resolution for objection to a particular draft measure.  
In this process the committee secretariats have a pivotal role in the management of RPS 
measures. In order to ensure technical capacity they engaged a limited number of extra staff 
to deal with comitology measures. These experts regularly meet in a 'comitology network', 
coordinated by the Conciliations and Co-decision (CODE) unit, created to exchange 
experiences. The CODE unit, together with the Legal Service, functions as a helpdesk for 
horizontal issues on comitology and also has contacts with the other institutions on key 
issues. Experience with the RPS suggests, with the exception of some committees (such as 
ENVI and ECON) that no adequate horizontal solution was found in the Parliament to 
address RPS measures. When opposition was garnered on RPS measures it tended to be more 
by accident than by design, something that will need to be seriously looked at for Delegated 
Acts.  
All in all, the administrative inter-institutional procedures between the Commission and the 
Parliament have adapted to RPS, but the results have been mixed. With regard to the 
Parliament’s response to RPS we find that it relied too heavily on individual arrangements of 
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committees, in particular on specific individuals within the committee such as party group 
coordinators, rapporteurs or secretariat staff. This is in line with scholarly findings arguing 
that formal legislative bodies may lose their legislative power by delegating responsibility to 
a small number of influential negotiators.
19
  
 
C What were the effects of RPS on the political procedures of the European 
Parliament? 
To cope with the new RPS procedure, the Parliament also amended the relevant article in its 
internal rules of procedure on implementing provisions. The amended Rule 81
20
 described the 
procedure to follow from the reception of a draft measure to the adoption of a Resolution 
objecting to a draft measure. The first paragraph of Rule 81 stated that the President of 
Parliament refers the draft measure to the committee responsible. It also stated that when the 
Parliament procedure for the basic legal act used associated committees, the lead committee 
shall invite each of the associated committees to communicate their view orally or by letter. It 
was not specified how, or to what extent, the lead committee should take these views into 
account. It was also not specified how other committees could express their views if they 
should wish to, meaning that members of these committees only got a chance to deal with the 
matter at the plenary stage.  
The second paragraph of Rule 81 outlined that the committee chairman should set a deadline 
for Members to propose objections to the draft measure. The parliamentary committee could 
decide to appoint a rapporteur, who could draft a Resolution opposing the draft measures. 
The draft Resolution should then first be voted in committee, and if adopted at this stage it 
would go to plenary for a vote. Although the Parliament only had a veto right on the whole 
draft measure and did not have a right of amendment, Rule 81 stated that the motion for a 
Resolution should indicate the changes that ought to be made to the draft measures, according 
to the Parliament. In case of adoption, this would give an indication to the Commission and 
Member States in which direction they should ‘amend’ the draft measure in order to satisfy 
the Parliament. This is interesting because RPS as such did not explicitly foresee any formal 
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right of amendment. Experiences show, however, that an informal parliamentary right of 
amendment had evolved with clear implications for Delegated Acts and we come back to this 
later.  
Although a general deadline of three months for expressing a veto may have seemed 
sufficient, the above mentioned procedure illustrates that this time period was clearly needed 
to adopt a Resolution in Parliament. In fact, this time period often proved to be rather short in 
practice. Parliamentary committees in general do not meet more often than once a month, and 
plenary meetings only take place once a month in Strasbourg, with an additional ‘mini-
plenary’ of two half days in between in Brussels. For this reason, Rule 81 foresaw the 
possibility of derogating from the full procedure, but only in cases of urgency or curtailed 
time limits. More specifically paragraph 4 stipulated that if the committee had not been able 
to meet before the next plenary that takes place before the deadline expired, a motion for an 
opposing resolution could be tabled for the plenary directly by the chairman of the committee 
responsible.  
But it is exactly these curtailed time limits, or urgency situations, that posed the Parliament 
problems in terms of adopting an objecting resolution within short time frames. If for 
instance the Commission presents a draft measure to the Parliament just after a plenary 
session has taken place with a curtailed time limit of two weeks, the Parliament may have no 
chance to get to the next plenary at all. These clauses were usually subject to strict control by 
the Parliament in the co-decision phase, on occasion leading to some tense inter-institutional 
negotiations. 
At the height of the financial crisis in autumn 2008, however, certain accounting rules had to 
be amended very quickly. The deadlines for the RPS had to be considerably shortened to 
enable the measures to be taken and implemented in the shortest possible period of time. This 
incident shows that it is very important for the Parliament that the urgency and curtailed time 
limit procedures
21
 are only used for cases that really require such urgency. Rule 81 gave the 
Parliament a sufficient framework to deal with these comitology measures, whereby we note 
that for cases of curtailed time limits or urgencies specific individuals again benefit from 
increased powers, notably committee chairman. This was notably the practise in the ECON 
committee where the chairwoman, Pervenche Berès (France, PES), took a personal interest, 
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and responsibility on behalf of the committee, to lead on a significant number of RPS 
measures. These examples on the parliamentary handling with RPS draft measures 
supplement the findings by Farrell and Héritier (2004) on the increased power of key 
individuals.  
In July 2010 the Parliament modified its rules of procedure, creating two separate rules for 
Delegated Acts and Implementing Acts. Rule 88, concerning Implementing Acts, outlines the 
internal procedure to be followed upon reception of an Implementing or Delegated Act. This 
procedure is identical to the old Rule 81. The new Rule 87a concerns Delegated Acts 
specifically, but as yet is devoid of content, merely stating that the Parliament shall scrutinize 
the measure and may submit a motion for a resolution in accordance with the provisions of 
the legislative act. 
 
D How often did the European Parliament oppose an RPS draft measure? 
One of the reasons why the Commission and Member States were never keen on giving a 
veto right to the Parliament, was their fear that the Parliament would be tempted to (ab)use 
the power too often. It is partly for this reason that the veto right given to the Parliament was 
limited to three legal criteria: not exceeding implementing powers, not in line with the aim or 
content of the basic act and not respecting subsidiarity or proportionality.  
Experience with the RPS procedure indicates that the Parliament did not abuse its veto 
power, or frustrate the smooth implementation of legislation. Actually the first use of the RPS 
veto came not from the Parliament, but from the Council. In July 2008, the Council 
objected
22
 to six draft measures that had previously been adopted by the comitology 
committee. What is interesting about this case is that the objection was based on a horizontal 
issue that had no relation with the content of the individual draft measures. It was namely the 
desire by Member States not to use correlation tables. The Parliament, on the other hand, only 
objected to three draft measures successfully (until summer 2010) in the areas of financial 
services (Capital Requirements Directive - CRD), energy (labelling of TVs) and food safety 
(Bovine and porcine thrombin) (see TABLE 3): 
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Capital Requirements Directive: A CRD RPS measure was opposed by the plenary in 
December 2008, on proposal of the parliamentary committee for economic and monetary 
affairs (ECON)
23
. The ECON Committee objected using the ‘exceeds implementing powers’ 
criteria.  In fact the Parliament was not alone on this point as the Council also raised an 
objection using the same legal criteria. On the one hand, Council deemed that an obligation 
for correlation tables belonged in the basic act and not in the draft measure.  The draft 
measure amended certain annexes of the directive, whereas the Commission had shortly 
before presented a proposal to review the CRD directive itself. Consequently, the Parliament 
felt that it could not approve a specific draft measure just before a more fundamental review 
under co-decision. The resolution for objection was voted on the 16 December 2008 with 627 
in favour, 10 against and 16 abstentions.
24
 
Energy labelling of TVs: On the 6 May 2009 the Parliament adopted its second resolution to 
object to an RPS measure, on the energy labelling of TVs. In this case the Parliament vetoed 
a new energy-rating labelling for TVs, proposed by the European Commission and approved 
by member states in the Eco-Design Regulatory Committee at the end of March 2009. The 
Parliament feared that the new system would confuse consumers and this was backed by 399 
votes in favour (393 were needed for an absolute majority). This created, in itself, a rather 
confusing situation because in the same sitting the Parliament failed to object to a second 
RPS measure on the energy labelling of fridges that proposed the very same energy-rating 
labels. The fridges vote received only 389 votes in favour, some 4 short of the absolute 
majority, a situation that creation confusion for the Commission as it tried to create a 
harmonised system across electrical products. This second Parliament objection was backed 
by intense lobbying, with the Parliament siding with the European Consumer Organisation, 
BEUC, in objecting to TVs and with fridge manufacturers in not objecting to the fridges 
measure. This issue of lobbying the Parliament on RPS measures will be taken up again later. 
Directive on food additives (bovine and porcine thrombin): The third successful resolution 
for objection was prepared by Åsa Westlund (Sweden, S&D) in the ENVI Committee before 
sealing the necessary majority in plenary by a very narrow vote (370 of 369 required votes 
for an absolute majority) on 19 May 2010 in Strasbourg. Based on the opinion of the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which had declared ‘meat glue’ safe, the 
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Commission called for thrombin to be added to the list of authorised additives mentioned in 
the EU Directive on Food Additives. The Parliament voted to ban bovine and porcine 
thrombin used as an additive to bind separate pieces of meat together into one piece because 
meat glue has no proven benefits and advantages for consumers and might mislead them 
instead. 
Apart from these three successful plenary votes, and one plenary failure, five further attempts 
were made to pass an objecting resolution, but all failed at the committee vote stage. These 
five cases occurred in the ENVI and ITRE committees, the first on the use of the biocide 
diffeneacoum, the second on the eco-design of household lamps, the third on substances and 
mixture, and the forth and fifth on inter-transmission system operator compensation. These 
objections and attempted objections are all presented in the following table: 
TABLE 3  Overview of parliamentary attempts to pass an objecting resolution  
Result Number of 
cases 
Details of cases 
No-adoption in parliamentary 
committee 
(simple majority) 
 
5 
 
Biocide; Eco-design of household 
lamps; Substances and mixtures; 
Inter-transmission system operator 
compensation 
 
No-adoption in plenary 
(absolute majority) 
 
1 
 
Energy labelling of fridges 
 
Successful adoption in plenary 
(absolute majority) 
 
3 
 
Capital Requirement Directive; 
Energy labelling of TVs; Bovine and 
porcine thrombin 
Source: Own data 
This table suggests that the Parliament has rarely objected to RPS measures. Out of 71 
(2008), 131 (2009) and 99 (2010) measures adopted according to RPS, the Parliament 
successfully objected to only three in plenary. This corresponds to a mere 1 %. In addition 
three failed at the committee stage and one was not adopted during the Strasbourg plenary. 
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This begs the question of why have there been so few objections by the Parliament? We can 
think of at least four possible answers: Firstly, there have not really been large-scale 
opportunities to do so, as the RPS procedure was only introduced into legislation as of 2006. 
Between 2008 and 31 July 2010 301 RPS measures were adopted, less than half of all 
codecision files adopted during Barroso I. It might have simply been a matter of time until 
the RPS was used more frequently, especially given that so much existing legislation was 
aligned to the RPS procedure, but this argument does not seem to be adequate. Secondly, the 
Parliament as a whole failed to fully grasp and understand the potential of the RPS procedure. 
The intricacies of comitology are not common knowledge in the Parliament, but with more 
time, and increased experience, it might have been expected that the Parliament use the RPS 
procedure more frequently. The seventh legislature is constituted by more than 50% new-
comers in the plenary of 736 members, so they will require time to get acquainted with this 
highly technical and complex EU decision making instrument. This said simply having more 
knowledgeable and experienced MEPs would not automatically lead to more objections. 
Thirdly, it may be that the presented draft measures were simply not controversial and 
therefore not contested. RPS measures are predominantly technical in nature and only a few 
come along with an important political dimension to which the Parliament will wish to object 
to.  
Finally, as some of the examples have shown, even if a draft resolution for objection is 
presented, it will not necessarily be adopted. A vote in the parliamentary committee is taken 
by simple majority of the members present, whereas the vote in plenary is taken by absolute 
majority, i.e. majority of the Parliament's component members. Given the fact that frequently 
in plenary votes not all 736 Members are present, such an absolute majority (369) can not be 
taken for granted. The ‘thrombin’ case is a good example. This high threshold represents a 
kind of ‘safety valve’ on the Parliament’s use of the veto power. Not all members may agree 
with the grounds for objection, and sometimes members may simply withhold support 
because they do not want to use the ‘atomic bomb’ and get the blame for blocking a draft 
measure only because of one particular aspect. The threat of using the ‘atomic bomb’ 
however shadows over the negotiations between the institutions and may result in an 
unforeseen additional parliamentary tool to change the content of a draft measure, a so-called 
de facto right of amendment, which we return to later. 
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E How did the Parliament get information to oppose a draft measure? 
An additional fear on the use of RPS by the Parliament was that its members would lack the 
necessary expertise, and interest, to judge complex and sector specific draft measures. 
Therefore, it was argued, they would rely too heavily on lobbyists in taking their decisions to 
object to a particular measure. In essence this criticism could be applied more generally as it 
is not specific only to the practise of comitology, but it was felt that the Parliament, more 
than the other institutions, would have to rely on external expertise.  
In the Parliament, whilst the committee secretariats mainly have a role of facilitation and 
transfer of information, they became key actors in issues related to RPS measures. The 
secretariat provides MEPs with expertise, for instance based on (scientific) knowledge from 
outside the institution and often drives an issue onto the agenda. A problem the Parliament is 
confronted with is that fact that a three month deadline evidently does not allow for in-depth 
external research, especially given the small numbers of secretariat and MEP support staff. 
This is where lobby organisations come in, as they have timely ready-made solutions having 
followed and monitored the issue. They can offer the required background information and 
detailed analysis within short periods of time. 
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that the RPS gave lobbyists an extra power to influence the EP, 
normally lobbyists try to 'sell' their point of view not only to the Parliament, but to all 
political actors involved in the EU decision-making process. This means that the same 
lobbyists have already been talking to the Commission officials drafting the implementing 
measures, and the national representatives in the comitology committees before they knock 
on the Parliament’s door. In fact, all actors can be influenced by lobbyists and it is their own 
decision to decide to what extent they take on board the views of lobbyists. This element of 
lobbying can be illustrated by the transport committee (TRAN) when it discussed a draft 
measure on the use of so called 'loop belts' for children in airplanes. Although safety tests 
conducted in the 1990s had shown the potential danger of these belts to children's health, the 
competent comitology committee had never amended the applicable rules. Discussion of the 
comitology draft measure concerned, in the Parliament, led to the suspicion that no 
amendment had been made due to pressure from the airlines, which did not want to spend 
money on extra seats for children, preferring them to sit on an adults lap even if this situation 
was potentially dangerous. If this assumption is true, it was in this case not the Parliament 
that gave in to particular interests, but other actors in the decision making arena. 
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On the other hand the energy labelling cases discussed earlier, which saw the highest levels 
of lobbying mobilisation on an RPS measure, highlight that the Parliament is a direct target of 
lobbying when interests are at stake – and it is possible to influence the outcome. Lobbying 
the Parliament is an end-game strategy if all else has failed because the power of the 
Parliament is to veto the whole measure, a veto that will probably only delay an outcome not 
stop it forever. MEPs, by definition, are politicians and they will judge draft measures from a 
political perspective. This perspective may be influenced by suggestions from lobbyists, 
journalists, experts, scientists or any particular group of people. MEPs will, however, always 
look at how the particular issue may fit with their personal views, the views of their political 
party or of the voters they represent, or from the point of view of the parliamentary 
committee of which they are a member, as far as there is a feeling of consensus there. Seen in 
this light it is no wonder that members of green political parties express themselves on 
environmental issues, as much in comitology as they do under the codecision procedure
25
.  
Given that Delegated Acts give the Parliament more power in objecting to a measure it can 
expected that lobbying of the Parliament will increase, but again only in the circumstances of 
trying to object to the whole measure.  
 
F What alternatives did the Parliament have to opposing a draft measure? 
The last three years have also shown the Parliament’s growing weight under RPS due to the 
emergence of a number of informal powers. Next to the formal adoption of resolutions 
blocking RPS measures according to the legal procedures a de facto parliamentary right of 
amendment has emerged, which may point at ways in which the Parliament will use its 
powers under Delegated Acts. This was seen in one case in which the Commission withdrew 
its draft RPS measure due to considerable parliamentary criticism, and two recent cases in 
which parliamentary committees drafted objecting resolutions that were withdrawn even 
before the vote in the parliamentary committee. This was done only after the Commission 
had indicated that the modifications required by the Parliament would be taken into account 
in a future revision of the implementing measures. It is worth looking at these informal 
powers in more detail.  
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Commission’s withdrawal: The first case concerns ‘body scanners’26 as a device to screen 
passengers at airports. The use of body scanners was one small part of a draft measure on 
aviation security. This draft measure was, according to the then Rule 81 of the Parliament's 
rules of procedure, referred to the transport committee. The TRAN committee did not intend 
to draft a resolution objecting to the measure. In the meantime, however, members of the civil 
liberties committee (LIBE) got hold of the issue and presented a ‘normal’ parliamentary 
resolution, under Rule 108 of the Parliament’s rules of procedure, to the plenary criticising 
the use of body scanners. Legally speaking, this Rule 108 resolution had no binding effect on 
the Commission. But, as the issue had raised significant media reaction and hence political 
responses in several Member States, the Commissioner responsible withdrew the draft 
measure.  
The ‘body scanners’ example shows us three things. Firstly, it illustrates that the horizontal 
coordination of implementing measures in the Parliament is not sufficient yet. Control 
mechanisms similar to those set up for the codecision procedure need to be established to 
facilitate the effective scrutiny of implementing measures by all members of the Parliament, 
not only those members in the responsible parliamentary committees. Second, the decision to 
withdraw the implementing measure was not based on the influence of a secretariat, lobbyist, 
or other group, but on the sensitivity of members involved in civil liberties matters. This 
highlights the fact that lobbyists, or the secretariat, can bring things to the attention of an 
MEP, but at the end of the day it is the member's political choice to proceed with an 
objection. And last, but not least, the mediatisation of technical implementing measures 
might further empower the Parliament, and help them to ask for further concessions from the 
Commission. 
De facto parliamentary right of amendment: In two cases parliamentary committees drafted 
objecting Resolutions that were withdrawn even before the vote in the committee took place. 
In these cases the Commission indicated that the modifications required by the Parliament 
would be taken into account in a subsequent revision of the implementing measures. These 
cases occurred in the parliamentary committees for environmental affairs (on the use of 
animal testing) and for transport and tourism (on the use of seatbelts for children in 
airplanes). The intentions of the Commission were made in letters to the parliamentary 
committee concerned, after which the draft Resolution was removed from the agenda. This 
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practice is particularly interesting, as it shows that the threat of a veto can lead to specific 
modifications, albeit in a future revision of the draft measure. In this way the Parliament 
developed a sort of ‘de facto right of amendment’, or a soft right of amendment. On the other 
hand, the concrete effect of this practice is yet to be evaluated, as the Parliament runs the risk 
that promises from the Commission are not kept and may even be forgotten if the time 
between revisions of implementing measures is relatively long, or new Commissioners or 
new Members of the Parliament are in charge. In such cases it may be up to the Parliament 
Secretariat to play the role of institutional memory. 
A second element that was present in all three of the cases discussed above, and in the three 
cases where measures were outvoted in the committee (see TABLE 3), was the active 
lobbying and intervention of the Commission in support of its RPS measures. It was 
obviously in the interests of the Commission to support its measures, but the level and 
intensity of the support was at times rather unexpected. 
 
IV Conclusions - Lessons to be drawn from the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny  
for Delegated Acts  
In light of the introduction of Delegated Acts, under Article 290 TFEU, the findings of this 
article on the practise of RPS are of particular practical and theoretical importance. Indeed 
this timely assessment of the RPS allows a number of preliminary conclusions to be drawn on 
how Delegated Acts can be expected to work in the future. After four years of experience 
with RPS a number of patterns have developed in the negotiation and use of the procedure, 
patterns that can be expected to continue. 
The first aspect of interest concerns the negotiation of the insertion of RPS into legislative 
texts. It was seen that the institutions, notably through the alignment process, gained 
significant shared experience with where and when to apply RPS. Whilst conceding that a 
grey zone continues to exist in some cases as to whether a Delegated Act or an Implementing 
Act should be used the practise of RPS shows that these differences were simply absorbed 
into part of the codecision negotiation process. This is a pattern that can be expected to 
continue, although we note that the negotiation of a Delegated Act into a legislative text 
could be more difficult in certain cases due to the need to agree on all the details on a case by 
case basis. The fact that the Parliament has significantly increased powers under Delegated 
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Acts will make it more attentive to the use of them, and to the exact conditions that are 
proposed. We would expect the experience of the RPS to serve as a very useful institutional 
learning curve for the insertion and negotiation of Delegated Acts. 
The second key element we described in this article concerns the changes that took place 
within the Parliament itself. It is clear, from both the capacity and technical perspectives that 
major efforts were made to try and deal with the influx of RPS measures. This effort will 
have to continue for Delegated Acts because from both capacity and technical perspectives 
horizontal solutions were not adequately found. Currently each parliamentary committee is 
striving to find its own best practise in dealing with measures, and some committees, due to 
the increased number of measures they have to deal with, are more advanced than others. 
This is a tendency one can imagine continuing in the future although there are important 
horizontal efforts to streamline best practise and deal with measures in a more uniform way. 
The real key in this sense is that it is vital to make sure that MEPs are fully briefed on the 
developments in the importance and use of Delegated Acts, so that they understand what it is 
and how they can use it. The amendment of Rule 81 of its rules of procedure gave the 
Parliament a framework to deal with RPS measures which has been replicated in the new 
Rules 87a and 88, so from a procedural point of view nothing has changed. The Parliament 
will use the procedure it created for RPS for Delegated Acts. From a procedural perspective 
we are likely to see a continuation of the trend of a few individuals driving the scrutiny of 
Delegated Acts within committees – the coordinators, Chairs and secretariat staff. 
A further element of how the Parliament deals with Delegated Acts, outside of the 
organisation structure, is the level of understanding and interest of MEPs in engaging with 
this decision-making procedure. The Parliament is first and foremost a legislative body and 
MEPs are mainly concerned with this aspect of their work. It is very difficult for an MEP to 
get to grips with the intricacies of the procedure of Delegated Acts and the substance of the 
individual measures within such short deadlines. In addition there is the element of political 
interest in these detailed measures, which is usefully quite low from the perspective of an 
MEP with limited time and resources. Two changes from RPS to Delegated Acts could 
transform this situation. Firstly Delegated Acts give the Parliament much more power than 
RPS and the powers are much clearer than before. Secondly, and closely related to the first 
point, is the fact that the Parliament now has the right of objection on any grounds, no longer 
the three legal criteria. This will make it considerably easier for the Parliament to scrutinise 
measures and will open the door to more individual input from MEPs who have an issue with 
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the content – and no longer need to understand how to apply three legal criteria. Once this is 
understood more MEPs could be expected to delve into detailed technical measures, meaning 
that whilst the procedural status quo from RPS to Delegated Acts will likely entail the 
continued importance of a few key actors in the Parliament, this easier understanding and use 
of the powers of objection could lead to a wider interest and involvement in Delegated Acts. 
As regards the usage of the RPS procedure we noted the surprising fact that the Council was 
the first to use its veto, not the Parliament. The Parliament has been moderate in the number 
of objections it has tried to raise, although to what extent this is due to the fact that there have 
not been too many RPS measures and that the majority are still to come in the future, to 
members not being familiar enough with the RPS procedure and its full potential, to the non-
controversial nature of the draft measures or because it is not easy to find a voting majority 
for resolutions, is rather unclear.  
TABLE 4 Summary of RPS activity since entry into force  
 Number 
of cases 
Details of cases 
Successful objection by Council 
(qualified majority) 
7 Correlation tables, 1 within Water 
Framework Directive, 5 within 
Biocides Directive; End-of-life 
vehicles 
Successful objection by Parliament  
(absolute majority) 
3 Capital requirements directive; 
Energy labelling of TVs; Thrombin 
Failed in Parliament Plenary 
(absolute majority) 
1 Energy labelling of fridges 
Failed in Parliament committee 
(simple majority) 
5 Biocide; Eco-design of household 
lamps; Substances and mixtures; 
Inter-transmission system operator 
compensation 
Withdrawn by Commission 1 Body-scanners 
Source: Own data 
In sum the Council rejected a set of seven draft measures, whereas the Parliament rejected 
three draft measures out of a total number of ten attempts to exercise its right of veto 
according to RPS. Out of the seven unsuccessful procedures, five were voted down in the 
parliamentary committee concerned and the other three led either to the Commission’s 
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withdrawal or were withdrawn by the Parliament itself before the committee vote, after 
promises had been made by the Commission. It is in this area of attempting to oppose a draft 
implementing measure that a series of unexpected developments arose. The most interesting 
of these, certainly for the future, was the experience of the Parliament being able to threaten 
with the RPS to extract a de facto right of amendment. This was often accompanied by heavy 
and intense lobbying by the Commission in support of its measures. These two trends are 
particularly relevant for Delegated Acts. Firstly Delegated Acts, like the RPS, do not allow 
for modifications, offering only a straight right of objection so the Parliament will likely be 
tempted to follow the same pattern in using the right of objection to an individual measure, or 
even the more nuclear option of revoking the entire delegation, to extract concessions and 
promises. We can expect this soft right of amendment to continue, and perhaps, given the 
increased powers of Delegated Acts, to actually increase in usage. Secondly the lobbying of 
the Parliament by the Commission is a trend that could also increase, depending on what 
mechanisms are put in place by the Commission to notify and engage the Parliament in the 
development of Delegated Acts before their formal transmission. The power to object to a 
Delegated Act on any grounds makes it vital that the Commission finds some early-warning 
or consultation mechanisms to engage the Parliament, otherwise it will find itself having to 
lobby the Parliament not to object to measures once they have been formally transmitted. 
Consequently, our theoretical contribution is three-fold. Firstly, in line with Héritier and 
Moury
27
, comitology and more specifically RPS, has become an additional element of 
negotiation in codecision. Throughout the alignment process of RPS into the existing acquis, 
the Parliament sought to delegate as much as possible to the RPS, anticipating its relative 
gain of power under this procedure. These empirical findings therefore confirm a distributive 
institutionalist argument according to which the Parliament seeks to maximize its institutional 
power. In addition, they are in line with Franchino
28
 showing that the amount of delegation 
and discretion allowed to the Commission increases when the voting rule is qualified 
majority, and if the policy area at stake is complex.
29
 This is interesting in light of the 
extended use of codecision and qualified majority voting under Lisbon, especially for those 
areas of legislation that involve extensive delegation of implementing powers to the 
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Commission, such as agriculture, energy, public health, commerce and humanitarian aid. This 
trend will almost certainly continue with Delegated Acts, which gives the Parliament even 
more power in the codecision procedure.  
Second, experiences with RPS have shown that formal legislative bodies, such as the full 
parliamentary plenary or committees, may lose their legislative power by delegating 
responsibility to a small number of influential negotiators.
30
 This group of influential 
negotiators with the RPS included party group coordinators and rapporteurs, who may not 
automatically mirror the full plenary composition according to geographical or ideological 
lines, but who can be biased towards policy outliers
31
, i.e. members with a high demand for 
the policies in their jurisdiction. It is possible, however, that the new powers and more 
straightforward ability to object with Delegated Acts leads to an increased awareness and 
usage of the right to object by more MEPs. 
Last but not least, our examples contribute to a better understanding of the relationship 
between formal and informal institutions, showing ‘how the two may be recursively 
related’.32 The 2006 amendment of Council Decision 1999/468/EC and its introduction of the 
RPS, providing the Parliament with a right of veto (formal institutional change) has given rise 
to a number of important informal processes and practises, such as the de-facto right of 
amendment (informal institutions), which, in turn, affects the current negotiations of future 
Delegated Acts. Overall, next to an increasing role in the legislative process, the Parliament, 
through the strategic use of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, has 
been successful in advancing its interests over time in the decision-making process of non-
legislative acts.  
Given the growing importance of delegated powers to the Commission a full knowledge and 
understanding, by all institutions and actors, of how they can use the formal and informal 
procedures is essential. In this sense there is a form of information advantage for those who 
grasp the full consequences, intended and other, of how the RPS worked in reality and what 
                                                          
30
 See H. Farrell and A. Héritier, ‘Interorganizational negotiation and intraorganizational power in shared 
decision making’, (2004) Comparative Political Studies 37(10), pp 1184-1212 and A. Rasmussen and M. 
Shackleton, ‘The Scope for Action of the European Parliament Negotiators in the Legislative Process: Lessons 
of the Past and for the Future’, Paper prepared for the Ninth Biennial International Conference of the European 
Studies Association. Austin, 31 March – 2 April 2005. 
31
 M. Kaeding and S. Hurka, ‘Where are the MEPs from the accession countries?  Rapporteurship assignments 
in the European Parliament after Enlargement’, (2010) Eipascope 2 pp 19-24 
32
 H. Farrell and A. Héritier, ‘Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-
Building in Europe’, (2003) Governance 16(4), pp 577 
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this implies for the practise and reality of Delegated Acts. This article has provided useful 
and timely practical and theoretical insights into what will, without doubt, become a more 
and more researched and lobbied area of EU decision-making. 
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